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CRIMINAL LAW
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE -

GRAND JURY CONTEMNOR

DENIED SUPPRESSION HEARING

In re Persico
Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, later codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, in
order to remedy the "totally unsatisfactory" emerging body of law'
relating to electronic surveillance. 2 Nonetheless, confusion resulting
from a conflict in the language of sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a) may
have thwarted this goal.3 Section 2515 excludes all evidence derived
from illegal electronic surveillance from certain enumerated proceedings, listing, inter alia, a grand jury examination. 4 However, section
2518(10)(a), providing for the motion to suppress such evidence, does
not include a grand jury proceeding among those wherein the motion
may be made.5 This seeming inconsistency places the witness in an
unenviable position. He may possess a statutory right to exclude certain evidence from a grand jury's consideration and thus prohibit a
I S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2c Sess. pt. 1, at 67-69 (1968) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 1097]. The law was thought to be intolerable from the viewpoint of either
privacy or justice. For a capsule history of the law prior to the Act, see 3 C. WRIGrr,
FEDERAL PRACICE & PROCEDURE

§ 665 (1969).

2 Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may
be authorized.
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 1, at 66. This purpose is to be effected by the narrow prescriptions in §§ 2516 and 2518 of the instances where interceptions may be authorized
and by the imposition of criminal and civil penalties in §§ 2511 and 2520 for unauthorized interceptions and disclosure of the contents of intercepted communications.
3 See, e.g., In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 980
(1972); In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971) (en banc), af'd sub nom. Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); Dudley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970). For a
discussion of the impact of the linguistic inconsistency of the statute, see 33 OHio ST.
L.J. 181 (1972); 25 VAND. L. REv. 206 (1972).
4 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970) provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter (emphasis added).
5 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970) provides in part:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom ....
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line of questioning based on such evidence. Yet, he would be incapable
of asserting that right since the remedial motion to suppress such
evidence would be unavailable to him.6
The Supreme Court took a step toward resolving this conflict in
Gelbard v. United States.7 Gelbard held that grand jury witnesses,
having refused to answer questions allegedly based on illegal electronic
surveillance, could invoke the exclusionary rule as a defense in contempt proceedings" initiated for such refusal.
In In re Persico,9 the Second Circuit considered the extent to
which a grand jury witness, currently subject to a contempt proceeding, could test the legality of the Government's surveillance which
led to the grand jury's line of questioning. In affirming a contempt
citation issued by the district court, the Second Circuit held that a
grand jury witness "is not entitled to a plenary suppression hearing
to test the legality of that surveillance."'1 Relying on Justice White's
concurring opinion in Gelbard, as well as the legislative history of the
6 This result is not inadvertent. The Senate report of the Act provides: "Because no

person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision
the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself." S. REP.
No. 1097, supra note 1, at 106. The problem is one of reconciling this provision with
the exclusionary rule of section 2515. See generally 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriC
6.03
(3), at 6-41 (2d ed. 1974).
7408 U.S. 41 (1972). Gelbard represented the consolidation of two separate actions.
The Court reversed United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971) and affirmed
In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
In Gelbard, several grand jury witnesses were cited in contempt for their refusal to
testify. The Government argued that the challenged wiretapping was authorized by the
district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970). The witnesses claimed that they should
be allowed to inspect the Government's files and records relating to the electronic surveillance and should be afforded an opportunity to suppress the use of any evidence so
secured. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the contempt, holding that
a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure
authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise,
or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding.
443 F.2d at 838.
In Egan, the grand jury witness was cited in contempt for refusing to testify. The
witness alleged that the grand jury's line of questioning was the product of illegal electronic surveillance. The Government failed to respond to the allegation. In vacating the
contempt order, the majority of the Third Circuit held that no court could order a
witness to testify where such testimony would violate the express congressional prohibition of § 2515, thus avoiding the issue of standing to suppress under § 2518(10)(a). 450
F.2d at 209. See 8 J. looRn, FEDERAL PRAaCCE 6.03(3) (2d ed. 1974); 85 HIAv. L. REv.
1060 (1972).
828 US.C. § 1826(a) (1970) provides in part:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand
jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an
order of the court to testify.., the court ... may summarily order his confinement ... until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony ....
9491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3225 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974). Justice
Douglas would have granted review of Persico. See 43 U.S.L.W. 3240.
10491 F.2d at 1162.
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Act, Judge Waterman interpreted the conflicting provisions "as requiring exclusion only when it is clear that a suppression hearing is
unnecessary . ,,n Accordingly, the court's unanimous decision narrowly limits the application of Gelbard to instances where the Government's electronic surveillance is "concededly unlawful."' 2
Persico, granted "use" and "derivative use" immunity, 3 had been
called before a federal grand jury investigating the control of racketeers over legitimate businesses. When questioned as to his occupation,
Persico refused to respond, claiming that the question was the product
of illegal electronic surveillance. The Government, conceding the questioning stemmed from electronic surveillance, urged the legality of the
surveillance based upon three court orders. The district court examined the court orders in camera and, finding them proper, denied
Persico's motion that a suppression hearing be held to determine if
the surveillance was unlawful. 14
Ordered to testify under threat of contempt, Persico remained
silent before the grand jury, clinging to his objection to the electronic
surveillance. The district court consequently held Persico in contempt.
Subsequent to the contempt citation, Persico reinstituted his motion
to suppress and claimed the right to examine the documents upon
ild. at 1161.
12 Id. at 1160.

Persico allows a grand jury witness to withhold testimony only when the Government has conceded that the surveillance is unlawful or where its invalidity is patent. Id.
at 1161. This patent invalidity would exist, for example, where no prior court order was
obtained, or where the unlawfulness of the surveillance had been established in a prior
judicial proceeding. Id.
Any attempt by Persico to establish unlawfulness by prior judicial proceeding was
effectively aborted in In re Persico, 362 F. Supp. 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Upon notification
of the surveillance as required by § 2518(8)(a), and prior to being called as a grand jury
witness, Persico applied to the district court for disclosure of the intercepted communications, interception orders, and applications for orders. An examination of these documents would reveal any statutory violation for which an adjudication of unlawfulness
might be obtained. See text accompanying notes 55-63 infra. However, the district court
denied Persico's motion as premature, thus forestalling his attempt to procure an adjudication of unlawfulness. The civil remedy provided by § 2530 once improper disclosure or use of the intercepts has been made and the suppression motion under § 2818
(10)(a) for attempted use of the intercepts as evidence were deemed sufficient protection
of Persico's exclusionary right under § 2515. 362 F. Supp. at 714. Ironically, when
Persico subsequently attempted to exclude the use of the surveillance before the grand
jury, Judge Waterman relegated him to a "prior judicial adjudication that the surveillance was unlawful." 491 F.2d at 1162.
Although Perisco might also have filed a criminal complaint under § 2511, commencement of a criminal proceeding would be at the prosecutor's discretion. Furthermore, the Government's good faith reliance on the court order would be a complete
defense in such proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
's 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970). This immunity was granted to circumvent the witness' fifth amendment privilege. For a discussion of "use" and "derivative use" immunity, see 48 ST. JohN's L. Rnv. 347 (1973).
14491 F.2d at 1158.
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which the wiretaps had been authorized. Both requests were denied,
as was his concurrent motion for bail pending appeal.' 5
Persico's refusal to testify before the grand jury was based upon
his contention that, under Gelbard, he was entitled to a hearing to
determine the legality of the electronic interceptions before being
compelled to testify.'0 Claiming that the surveillance was presumptively illegal,1 7 he argued that the mere fact that a court order had
been issued should not foreclose a plenary hearing in the contempt
proceeding.' The narrow question posed for the court's consideration
was whether a grand jury witness, in defending against a contempt
citation, is entitled to a suppression hearing to test the legality of
electronic surveillance conducted under court order.1 9
In responding negatively to this question, Judge Waterman noted
that Gelbard "technically" did not decide the issue whether a grand
jury witness may refuse to answer questions if the interceptions were
pursuant to court order.2 0 However, the panel relied strongly on Justice White's concurring opinion in Gelbard, wherein he intimated
that when the Government produces a court order, the interest in
preserving the unimpeded functioning of the grand jury should prevail over the witness' interest in testing the legality of the surveillance.2'1
15 Id. at 1158-59.
10ld. at 1160.
17Id. at 1157. See note 20 infra.
's 491 F.2d at 1160.
19 See id. at 1157-58.
20 Id. at 1162.
In Gelbard, the Ninth Circuit held that grand jury witnesses had no right to invoke the § 2515 exclusion as a defense in a contempt proceeding. 408 U.S. at 61 n.22.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that these witnesses are possessed
of such right. Id. at 52. For purposes of its decision, the Court assumed that despite the
court order, the invocation of the exclusionary defense would prohibit the evidence
derived from the surveillance from introduction before the grand jury. Id. at 46-47.
However, the Supreme Court reserved to the district court the resolution of the specific
issue of "whether [these witnesses] may refuse to answer questions if the interceptions
were pursuant to court order." Id. at 61 n.22.
The Third Circuit's decision in In re ,Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'd sub
noma. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), was also based upon the assumption
that the witness' allegations of illegality were true since she had not been afforded a
hearing. 450 F.2d at 201-02. In Egan, however, the Government produced no court order.
It was probably these assumptions upon which Persico relied in claiming that the
surveillance was "presumptively illegal." 491 F.2d at 1157. See text accompanying note
17 supra. However, the district court denied Persico's right to a suppression hearing,
not his right to invoke a § 2515 defense. As previously mentioned, the Gelbard assumption of unlawfulness was premised on the Ninth Circuit's denial of a right to invoke
the exclusionary rule as a defense. Moreover, Gelbard makes no mention of an evidendary presumption of unlawfulness. Although not expressly addressing his remarks to the
question of a presumption of unlawfulness, Judge Waterman may have believed that the
district court's in camera examination of the court orders was sufficient to rebut any
such presumption. 491 F.2d at 1158, 1162. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
21 Where the Government produces a court order for the interception, however,
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Judge Waterman also examined the legislative history of the Act, 22discerning two apparently inconsistent statutory policies: "the exclu-.
sion of illegally acquired evidence and the maintenance of unimpeded
grand jury proceedings ....,"23He concluded that to allow a plenary
suppression hearing in order to establish alleged illegality would frus24
trate the latter aim of the legislation.
and the witness nevertheless demands a full-blown suppression hearing to determine the legality of the order, there may be room for striking a different
accommodation between the due functioning of the grand jury system and the
federal wiretap statute.
408 U.S. at 69-70 (White, J., concurring).
Mr. Justice White's dictum has been subjected to criticism in In re Korman, 351 F.
Supp. 325, 328 (N.D. II. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973) and in Boudin, The
Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEo, LJ. 1, 11 (1972). First, the grand jury investigation would
be interrupted only as to the witness cited in contempt. Moreover, the interest to be
balanced against the due functioning of the grand jury would seem to be the liberty of
the witness refusing to testify rather than the abstract "federal wiretap statute." Finally,
hearings have not been considered intolerably disruptive of grand jury functioning
where common law, constitutional, or statutory privileges are involved. See United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973), quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688
(1972); Note, United States v. Dionisio: The Federal Grand Jury and the Fourth Amendmert, 73 COLUAt. L. REv. 1145 (1973); 85 HIARv. L. REv. 1060, 1069 (1972).
22 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 1. This report has been a fertile source of confusion.
See, e.g., cases cited note 3 supra; Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEo. L.J. 1
(1972); Duff & Harrison, The Grand Jury in Illinois: To Slaughter a Sacred Cow, 1973
U. ILL. L.F. 635; 60 Gao. L.J. 1340 (1972); 85 HAv. L. REv. 1060 (1972); 33 Omo ST. L.J.
181 (1972); 25 VAND. L. Rav. 206 (1972).
It was the ambiguous language of the report which led Chief Judge Bazelon to declare in Evans that "it is our function to interpret statutes, not committee reports ...
In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
23491 F.2d at 1161.
241d. at 1161-62.
Additional support for the court's decision to foreclose Persico's suppression hearing
was gleaned from "[t]he Supreme Court's continuing concern over potential obstructions
to the expeditious performance of the grand jury's function [as] illustrated by its recent
decision in United States v. Calandra...." Id. at 1160 n.3. See United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974). However, the court's attempt to buttress its decision by relying on
Calandra is unpersuasive. Calandra denied the extension of a fourth amendment right
to exclude evidence from a grand jury. Gelbard recognized a grand jury witness' statutory right to refuse testimony by invoking the § 2515 exclusionary rule as a defense in
a contempt proceeding. To deny a suppression hearing to vindicate a specifically granted
statutory right on the strength of a decision denying the extension of a fourth amendment right is a non sequitur. Although Calandra expressed concern over the expeditious
performance of the grand jury's function, the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished
the Gelbard holding on the basis of Title III, which "represented a congressional effort
to afford special safeguards against the unique problems posed by misuse of wiretapping
and electronic surveillance." 414 U.S. at 355 n.11 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court stated that the grand jury
"must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered . . .so long as it does not trench
upon the legitimate rights of any witnesses called before it." Id. at 17-18 (emphasis
added). The Court therein affirmed the order of contempt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)
(1970) which issued after a hearing had been held.
Apart from the absence in Calandra of the unique problems posed by the misuse of
electronic surveillance, another crucial distinction exists in that the grand jury witness
in Calandra was not defending a contempt citation, as was Persico. In determining
whether Persico had a right to a suppression hearing in defending a contempt citation,
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Persico argued that a contempt proceeding is suffidently removed
from a grand jury investigation so as to render inapplicable the proscription against suppression hearings in a grand jury proceeding. This
contention was deemed only superficially tenable, the court believing
that the contempt mechanism is so closely bound to the grand jury
proceeding that "any expansion of the breadth of inquiry" in the contempt proceeding would necessarily inhibit the "smooth functioning"
of the grand jury.25 Persico also asserted that Rule 42 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for a hearing whenever
the contempt is not committed in the actual presence of the court,
should have been applied.26 The court disposed of this assertion by
noting that the purpose of Persico's confinement was coercive, not
punitive. 27 Hence, the nature of the contempt was civil,28 and the
29
summary procedure was therefore applicable.
the interest to be balanced against the unimpeded functioning of a grand jury would
be his right to due process in a proceeding to deprive him of his personal liberty. See

United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir. 1973). In denying Persico's right to
a suppression hearing, Judge Waterman erroneously measured his interest as merely a
"witness's [sic] interest in exploring in depth the validity of the surveillance." 491 F.2d
at 1160.
25491 F.2d at 1162. But see Cobbledick v. United States, 809 U.S. 328 (1940), wherein
Justice Frankfurter, for a unanimous Court, wrote:
Whatever right [a grand jury witness] may have requires no further protection

..
than that afforded by the district court until the witness chooses to disobey
and is committed for contempt. At that point the witness' situation becomes so
severed from the main proceeding as to permit an appeal.... [T]his too may
involve an interruption... of the investigation. But not to allow this interruption would forever preclude review of the witness' claim, for his alternatives
are to abandon the claim or languish in jail.
Id. at 328 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also 9 J. MooRE, FEDEL_ PaAcrIcE
R
110.13(2) (2d ed. 1973).
26491 F.2d at 1162.
Under FED). P_ CaIM P. 42(a), a direct criminal contempt may be summarily punished only if the contempt is committed in the actual presence of the court. Notice and
a hearing are required under rule 42(b) for any contempt occurring outside the actual
presence of the court. See 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrxc
42.04(2) (2d ed. 1974); 8 C.
WRiGHT, FERAsL. PRAcricE & PnocamuaE §§ 707, 709 (1969).
27491 F.2d at 1162.
28For an explanation of the distinction between criminal and civil contempt, see

8A

J.

MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricx

42.02(2) (2d ed. 1974); 8 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL

PRACrIcE

& PuocEDuan § 704 (1969). Professor Moore believes that such a facile distinction is undesirable.
29 See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970); note 8 supra.
The legislative history of § 1826 states cryptically that "[tuhe procedure is designed
to codify present practice." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 6, at 46 (1970).
The Ninth Circuit interpreted "present practice" as the application of rule 42(b), which

requires notice and a hearing, to a contempt proceeding against a recalcitrant witness
under § 1826(a). United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit
found that the Supreme Court had "effectively banished" the impression that the word
"summarily," as used in § 1826(a), evokes the concept of a summarily punishable direct
criminal contempt. 482 F.2d at 1020-31. See notes 44-46 & accompanying text infra.
Both Professors Moore and Wright regard the use of summary contempt with disfavor. See 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrsc
42.02(1), at 42-6 (2d ed. 1974); 8 C. WRIGHr,
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The decision of the court in Persico indicates that the law relating to electronic surveillance remains in a "totally unsatisfactory"
state. By focusing on Justice White's concurring opinion in Gelbard
and on the rather nebulous history of Title III,80 as opposed to the
Gelbard majority's opinion and recent developments in other circuits,
Judge Waterman may have overlooked the remedial nature of Title
III. Furthermore, the court's holding that a grand jury witness never
has a right to a suppression hearing may well eviscerate the effect of
Gelbard. The section 2515 exclusionary defense will be of little avail
if a witness cited in contempt is denied the right to a hearing to
resolve genuine issues as to whether the questioning was the product
of illegal electronic surveillance. 31 Hence, the witness is consigned "to
32
abandon ... [his] claim or languish in jail."
Judge Waterman did acknowledge that Persico's claim of unlawfulness was entitled to some type of judicial cognizance. However, he
observed that "[i]nasmuch as [the district judge] conducted an in camera inspection . . . [of the court orders], Persico received all that he
was entitled to receive.. 3 Thus, an in camera inspection was deemed

sufficient protection of any right asserted by Persico in the contempt
proceeding.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gelbard strongly suggests that
a recalcitrant grand jury witness' claim of unlawful surveillance would
merit a deeper probe than that afforded in Persico. Writing for the
majority of the Court, Justice Brennan noted that "the protection of
privacy was an overriding congressional concern"3 4 in the enactment
FEDERAL PRAcrICE & PROCEDURE § 707, at 165 (1969). No authority was cited by Judge

Waterman in applying the summary contempt procedure in Persico.
30 See note 22 supra.
31 Persico leaves the witness dependent for the preservation of his exclusionary right
upon the integrity and good faith of the Government in conceding that the questioning
is the product of unlawful surveillance. Such dependence was generally abhorred by the
Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also text accompanying notes 66-68 infra. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's determination that a
prior adjudication of the illegality of the surveillance would justify a witness' refusal to
testify, see note 12 supra.
32 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940).
33 491 F.2d at 1162. This aspect of the court's decision is peculiar in light of United
States v. Russ, 482 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1973). In Huss, a trial witness appealed an order of
contempt for his refusal to testify. Chief Judge Kaufman, in a unanimous opinion, stated
that
when illegal electronic surveillance has come to light it is the adversary system,
not representations by the government and not in camera decisions by the court,
which must be relied upon to determine whether overheard matter is "relevant"
to the taint hearing.
Id. at 50, citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183-84 (1969). See also 3 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 708, at 171 (1969).
34 408 U.S. at 48.
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of Title III, and that "'[o]nly by striking at all aspects of the problem
[of unlawful surveillance] can privacy be adequately protected.'-35
This "overriding congressional concern" would seem to merit greater
protection of privacy than that afforded by an in camera examination
of the court orders. To deny a plenary suppression hearing in the face
of the witness' claim of unlawfulness may well be "adding to the injury of the interception the insult of compelled disclosure."8 6 A suppression hearing subsequent to the contempt proceeding would come
too late to prevent that insult.
Additional factors within the Gelbard decision strongly imply that
an unyielding witness defending a contempt citation is entitled to
something more than an in camera examination of court orders produced ex parte. First, the Gelbard majority held that section 702 of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,37 entitled "Litigation concerning sources of evidence," established the procedure to be followed
"upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because' of an illegal interception." 38 The in camera inspection afforded Persico would appear to fall short of the "litigation" contemplated by the Gelbard majority. Second, Justice Douglas, concurring
in Gelbard, forcefully stated that "these witnesses deserve opportunities to prove their allegations and, if successful, to withhold from the
35 Id. at 50, quoting S. RE. No. 1097, supra note 1, at 69.
36408 U.S. at 51-52.
37 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970). This section provides in part:
(a) In any ...proceeding in or before any. . . grand jury...
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall
affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act;
(b) As used in this section "unlawful act" means any act [sic] the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device (as defined in section 2510(5) of this
title) in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant thereto.
38408 U.S. at 54, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1970).
The Court in Gelbard also considered the legislative history of § 2518 which states
that "the provision does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context
of [the grand jury] proceeding itself." S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 1, at 106. The Court
believed that "[t]his assertion is not ambiguous, for motions to suppress evidence to be
presented to a grand jury would presumably be made in court." 408 U.S. at 59-60 n.20.
The Court recognized the rule, as stated in the report, that "[n]ormally, there is no
limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury ...." Id.
at 60, quoting S. R.EP. No. 1097, supra note 1, at 106. It was stated, however, that "that
rule has nothing whatever to do with the situation of a grand jury witness who has
refused to testify and attempts to defend a subsequent charge of contempt." 408 U.S. at
60.
The Court then concluded that "suppression motions, as a method of enforcing the
prohibition of § 2515, must be made in accordance with the restrictions upon forums,
procedures, and grounds specified in § 2518(10)(a)." Id. at 61.
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Government any further rewards of its 'dirty business.'
Finally,
Justice Rehnquist's dissent was premised on the notion that the majority holding would extend a plenary suppression hearing to a recalcitrant grand jury witness. The dissent interpreted the majority as
holding that the witnesses "must be entitled to the discovery and fac"9

tual hearing which they seek ... . ."o In addition to the apparent

misinterpretation of Gelbard, Judge Waterman's opinion in Persico
fails to make any mention of the reaction to Gelbard by other circuits.
The inquiry in other circuits has focused on whether the grand jury
witness has raised substantial issues sufficient to entitle him to a suppression hearing in a contempt proceeding. 41 In Beverly v. United
States,4 2 the Fifth Circuit granted extensive hearings to a grand jury
witness defending a contempt charge, despite the Government's denial
that any electronic surveillance had taken place. 43 In United States
v. Alter,44 the Ninth Circuit determined that "a proceeding in contempt to compel a federal grand jury witness to testify is ... criminal
enough to require the application of Rule 42(b) . . -."
The recal-

citrant witness in Alter was thus entitled to an "uninhibited adversary
hearing" on his claim of unlawful electronic surveillance notwithstanding the Government's denial of any such surveillance. 4 Despite this
39 408 U.S. at 63 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also Justice Douglas'
dissent from the denial of certiorari in Meisal v. United States, 412 U.S. 954 (1973).
40 408 U.S. at 79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
41 See, e.g., In re Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973); United
States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973); In re Horn,
458 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1972). See also 8 J. MooRE, FERAL PRAorMcE
6.03(a), at 6-41 (2d
ed. 1974).
42468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972). Beverly also allowed a grand jury witness to refuse
testimony when his counsel had been subjected to electronic surveillance.
43 After a show cause hearing, the lower court cited the witness in contempt. Under
Gelbard, the Fifth Circuit vacated the contempt order and remanded for further hearings and entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law notwithstanding the Government's denials of electronic surveillance. Id. at 737-38 n.10. The court held that once a
claim of illegal electronic surveillance is filed, the district judge should require "specific
affirmances or denials under Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3504(a)(1) . . . as the prerequisite to
civil contempt orders on refusals by the witness to testify." Id. at 752. The court then
outlined the requirements for a claim of unlawful electronic surveillance of counsel. Id.
44 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973).
45 Id. at 1023. In reaching this decision, Judge Hufstedler stated that the interest of
an unimpeded grand jury investigation "must nevertheless yield to the paramount due
process right of a potential contemnor to have adequate notice and a fair opportunity
to defend himself." Id. It is submitted that this balance more accurately reflects the interests at stake than the balance employed by Judge Waterman in Persico. See text accompanying note 21 supra. See also note 24 supra.
46 482 F.2d at 1020, 1024. Judge Hufstedler stated that
[the costitutional guarantee of due process of law means more than a silhouette
of justice; it requires that judicial determinations affecting the freedom of the
individual be openly arrived at after full, fair, and vigorous debate on both sides
of all substantial issues.
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authority, the court in Persico focused upon, and answered negatively,
the question whether the witness would ever be entitled to such a
hearing.
Assuming arguendo that the holding of Persico was meant to be
strictly limited to its facts, 47 a suppression hearing in a contempt proceeding should not be precluded by mere production of a court order.
Indeed, on facts defying distinction from Persico, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, in In re Lochiatto,48 reached a conclusion inconsistent with that of the Second Circuit. In Lochiatto, the district court
had held a recalcitrant grand jury witness in contempt after having
conducted an in camera examination of court orders produced by the
Government. 49 Chief Judge Coffin, writing for a unanimous panel,
reversed the contempt, finding "no basis in the statute for concluding
that prosecutorial say-so is a sufficient guarantee of lawfulness . . .,50
Recognizing the importance of the unimpeded functioning of the
grand jury, the chief judge also weighed "the articulated congressional
skepticism about electronic monitoring as an insidious invasion of
privacy to be singled out for special scrutiny and safeguards"51 and
the fact that "the affected individual has much at stake."5 2 Balancing
Id. at 1024. He then listed the requirements of a claim of electronic surveillance sufficient
to raise such an issue. Id. at 1026.
47Judge Waterman narrowly framed the issue as involving electronic surveillance
conducted under court order. 491 F.2d at 1157-58. However, his statement of the court's
holding was much broader in focus:
We hold that in contempt proceedings initiated when a witness . . . refuses to
answer questions propounded by a grand jury because he claims he is entitled
to a hearing to ascertain whether the questions posed are the product of unlawful electronic surveillance the witness is not entitled to a plenary suppression

hearing to test the legality of that surveillance.
Id. at 1162.
The Second Circuit has favorably reiterated the Persico ruling that a recalcitrant
grand jury witness defending a contempt citation is not entitled to a suppression hearing. In re Vigorito, 499 F.2d 1351, 1354 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 US.L.W.
3123 (U.S. Sept. 4, 1974) (No. 74-232). Vigorito denied the right to a suppression hearing

to a non-witness seeking to exclude evidence from the grand jury's consideration.
48497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974).
49 Id. at 805.
GOld. at 806. See also United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 88, 50 (2d Cir. 1973), wherein
the Second Circuit stated:

[JWe cannot rely solely on the government's "good faith" representation on such
a critically contested issue. Indeed, the government's good faith did not prevent
illegal wiretapping here ....

51497 F.2d at 807 (emphasis added). The court noted that "[uit is clear from Gelbard
that this concern survives passage through grand jury doors." Id., citing United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346, 355-56 n.11 (1974).
52497 F.2d at 807. Although the witness could avoid incarceration by testifying, the
First Circuit
read the statutory scheme as giving a witness the right to avoid a Hobson's
choice between jail and testimony by mounting at least a limited challenge
which, like a declaratory judgment, can clarify his rights before he risks sanction.
Id. See note 25 & text accompanying notes 31-52 supra.
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these considerations, the First Circuit held that the witness was entitled
to
an opportunity for inspection of these limited materials: the authorized application of the Attorney General or his designate,
. . .the affidavits in support of the court order, the court order
itself, and an affidavit submitted by the Government indicating
53
the length of time the surveillance was conducted.
Thus, the mere existence of a court order did not foreclose the witness'
54
right to disclosure as a preliminary step to a suppression hearing.
It is well settled that the mere existence of a court order does not
preclude the unlawfulness of the surveillance. The existence of a court
order is merely one of many statutory requirements for a lawful invasion of an individual's privacy.5 5 For example, in United States v.
Giordano,5 6 the Supreme Court held that improper authorization of
an application for a court order in violation of section 2516(1)"w rendered the surveillance unlawful and was a ground for suppression
under section 2515.58 Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court,
found that "pre-application approval was intended to play a central
role in the statutory scheme and

. . .

suppression must follow when

it is shown that this statutory requirement has been ignored."5 9 Furthermore, in United States v. Huss,6 0 the Second Circuit reversed a
civil contempt because the Government had destroyed original wiretap tapes in violation of section 2518(8)(a).6 1 These decisions evidence
53 497 F.2d at 808.

54 Indeed the crux of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Gelbard was premised on the
notion that the majority had entitled the witnesses to "sweeping discovery as a prelude
to a full [suppression] hearing." 408 U.S. at 73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1970).
56 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
57

18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970) provides in part:

The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated
by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge . . .
for ... an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications ....
58 We conclude that Congess; did not intend the power to authorize wiretap ap-

plications to be exercised by any individuals other than the Attorney General
or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him and that primary
or derivative evidence secured by wire interceptions pursuant to a court order
issued in response to an application which was, in fact, not authorized by one
of the statutorily designated officials must be suppressed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515 ....
416 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 528.
60 482 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1973).
61 Id. at 50-51. 18 US.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1970) provides in part:
The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means au-

thorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded. .

.

.They shall not be
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the fact that any one of a number of violations of the statutory requirements may be a ground for suppression, 2 and thus represent
"just cause" for the grand jury witness' refusal to testify. 63
The foregoing review of authorities indicates that a recalcitrant
grand jury witness, alleging unlawful surveillance as a defense in a
contempt proceeding, should be entitled to a plenary suppression hearing to determine the lawfulness of the surveillance. As a court order
does not preclude illegality, it should not preclude a full adversarial
hearing to test the lawfulness of the surveillance. To forego the adversarial procedure may involve the courts in what ultimately might prove
to be illicit governmental activity.64 Surely the interest in preserving
an uninterrupted grand jury investigation cannot be so compelling
as to justify this ominous possibility. Obligating a witness who may
be the victim of illegal wiretapping to testify under threat of imprisonment, absent a hearing to test the legality of the surveillance, "is
to stand our whole system of criminal justice on its head." 65
An early suppression hearing would not only protect the rights
of victimized witnesses but would also avoid the waste of precious
judicial time. Judge Waterman's reliance upon the Government to
concede unlawful surveillance 6 presupposes that its illegality will be
promptly discovered. However, an appellate court has not infrequently
destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any

event shall be kept for ten years.
62But cf. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 570 (1974), wherein a majority of

the Court intimated that not every statutory violation would be a ground for suppression. The Court held that misidentification in violation of §§ 2518(l)(a), (4)(d) is not a

ground for suppression where the application for the court order had in fact been
properly authorized pursuant to § 2516(1). Id. at 571. Justice Douglas, writing for the
minority, believed that "disclosure is 'in violation of' Title III when there has not been
compliance with any of its requirements." Id. at 585.
63 The fact that the grand jury's questioning was based upon inadmissible evidence

would constitute "just cause" for the witness' refusal to testify under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)
(1970). See note 8 supra.
64 The Second Circuit in Huss presumably realized this danger:
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites

every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in
the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means ...would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely

set its face.
482 F.2d at 52-53, quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The legislative history of the preamble to Title III of the Act also recognized the
protection of the integrity of the court as one of the goals of the Act. S. R m. No. 1097,

supra note 1, at 89.
65 In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
66 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:300

found it necessary to overturn a contempt adjudication 67 or a criminal
conviction 6 8 due to the discovery of evidence previously overlooked by
the Government. The time of both the lower court in rendering its
determination and the appellate court on review is thereby needlessly
consumed by virtue of the Government's inefficient search of its wiretap records. A full adversary hearing would minimize the instances
of such unwarranted expenditure of judicial time and effort.
The decision in Persico also appears to frustrate the congressional
policy sought to be fostered in the field of electronic surveillance.
First, by promulgating Title III, Congress intended to provide uniformity in this area of the law. 69 However, the present conflict in the
circuits leaves a grand jury witness' right to object to unlawful surveillance dependent upon the geographic location of the court wherein
the objection is raised.70 Furthermore, Persico overlooks the fundamental congressional intent to strictly limit the use of electronic
surveillance and the "overriding congressional concern" to protect
individual privacy.71 In keeping with this intent, the federal wiretap
statute 2 should be strictly construed in favor of the rights of the indi73
vidual.
Christopher R. Belmonte
67
In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901 (lst Cir. 1974), judgment vacated sub nom. Marcus v.
United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. June 10, 1974); United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d
1193 (2d Cir. 1973).
68Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The Alderman Court vehemently
rejected the sufficiency of an in camera judgment where the liberty of the individual is
at stake. Id. at 183-84.
Adversary proceedings are a major aspect of our system of criminal justice. Their
superiority as a means for attaining justice . . is nowhere more evident than
...
where an issue must be decided on the basis of a large volume of factual
materials ....
Id. The application for a court order, the court order itself, and the Government's records of the surveillance constitute the very "large volume of factual materials" crucial
to the determination of the lawfulness of the surveillance in Persico. The Court in Alderman pointed out that adversary proceedings substantially reduce the incidence of error
in such a context by alleviating the trial judge's burden of examining the voluminous
material in camera and by allowing the litigants to participate in the inspection. Id. at
184, 209. Indeed, where the liberty of the recalcitrant witness turns upon the lawfulness
of the surveillance as determined from the "large volume of factual materials," the incidence of error should be minimized by an adversary hearing.
69 See note 2 supra.
70 By denying certiorari in Persico, 43 US.L.W. 3225 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974), the Supreme Court has declined an opportunity to resolve this conflict.
71 See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 596 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1972); In re
Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1974).
72 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
73 See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 597 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Fla. 1973); 60 Gao. LJ. 1340, 1346 (1972).

